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Bargaining and Negotiations* 
What should experimentalists explore more thoroughly? 
 
    W e r n e r   G ü t h  
       






A long time ago most economists would have limited themselves to stating that 
agreements should be individually rational and efficient and that selecting a specific 
agreement from that set depends on bargaining and negotiation power whatever that 
may be. Nowadays hardly any economist will argue that way. The change has been 
brought about by the strategic approach to bargaining and cooperation and the 
parallel experimental studies of bargaining and negotiation. When arguing what 
should be explored more thoroughly, we will point out directions where previous 
efforts may have been misdirected, where importing new methods may be helpful or 
even needed, and where new research questions need to be asked and answered. 
 
Keywords: (un)bounded rationality, (non-)cooperative game theory, bargaining and 
negotiation (theory and experiments) 








  The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments by Gary Bolton.     
 
 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 012  2
1. Introduction 
 
Future directions of research in experimental economics can be (i) predicted as well 
as (ii) recommended. When attempting (i), one probably does what is usual when 
trying to predict the future, namely relying on past experiences in order to infer what 
they might suggest. In case of (ii), one can never be sure how much 
recommendations are biased by one’s own research agenda. Trying to clearly 
distinguish between (i) and (ii) may be attempted but will probably fail. 
In the following, we will therefore simply outline some warnings regarding previous 
research (section 2), state some conjectures about future directions (section 3), and 
finally raise some hopes (section 4) before concluding (section 5). 
 
Unlike Camerer (2003), concluding with ten most important research 
questions/topics, our attitude is to grant not only heterogeneity in experimental 
behavior but also in experimenter behavior. This renders the notion of clear cut future 
directions in experimental economics questionable and rightly so: an evolving field of 
research like experimental economics should satisfy the Darwinian requirements of 
retention (Don’t forget the earlier research!), variation (Try out new designs!), and 
selection (You should more often than not follow ideas which so far proved to be 




2.  Possible misdirections in the past 
 
Especially by ultimatum bargaining (Güth, 1976) and the extensive tradition of 
ultimatum (bargaining) experiments (see Güth et al., 1982, and Camerer, 2003, for a 
recent survey), it became clear that one must clearly distinguish between 
 
  the (game) theoretic prediction based on common(ly known) opportunism 
in the sense that each bargaining party maximizes her own material payoff 
and 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 012  3
  actual, e.g. experimentally observed bargaining behavior, influenced by the 




Thus it became clear very early that when designing institutions of bargaining and 
negotiation there will be two directions, namely one based on common(ly known) 
rationality and one based on empirical findings. Not distinguishing between the two is 
partly responsible for the still prevailing illusion of some economists that game theory 
well predicts actual behavior. 
 
Warning 1:  Too many bargaining experiments still mainly test the game 
theoretic prediction without trying to supplement the rational 
choice approach by a behaviorally more salient alternative. 
 
Of course, in some simple tasks game theory can predict well. But as we should have 
learned from playing chess this does not extend very far
2. Nevertheless, widely 
noticed theoretical studies, e.g., of infinite horizon-alternating offer bargaining 
(Rubinstein, 1982), inspired experimental tests of such models although an infinite 
horizon cannot be implemented experimentally (e.g. Felsenthal et al., 1990).  
But the problem is a much deeper one: bargaining experiments with alternating offers 
and rather short commonly known horizon and with information retrieval, controlled 
via the mouse lab technique, have shown (Johnson et al., 2002) that the (game) 
theoretically convincing idea of backward induction is not in line with the way we 
reason in multi-stage negotiations. Rather than reasoning backward, we seem to 
imagine some bargaining play whose reasonableness is then checked without 
necessarily specifying at the beginning in detail how to end. 
 
Ariel Rubinstein’s bargaining model has the advantage of a unique subgame perfect 
equilibrium. This avoids equilibrium selection as, for instance, by the so-called Nash 
(1953)-bargaining solution for one-stage demand games with lots of strict equilibria. 
                                            
1 We do not discuss experiments using non-student participants (e.g. newspaper experiments like 
Güth et al., 2003 and 2007) or so-called field experiments. 
2 Tournament chess is finite and has therefore subgame perfect equilibrium solutions which no one 
can describe. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 012  4
But in the light of experimental evidence the difference is behaviorally not so 
straightforward. 
 
Warning 2:  Unique equilibrium predictions usually fail and equilibrium  
selection in bargaining experiments may be obvious due to 
imported sharing norms. 
 
The first point is clearly demonstrated by reward allocation/dictator experiments with 
and without entitlement (Mikula, 1973, Shapiro, 1975, Forsythe et al., 1994) as well 
as by ultimatum experiments. Furthermore, in one-stage demand game experiments 
(all parties independently state their demand which is what they receive if the “pie” 
suffices to satisfy them all whereas otherwise they earn nothing) the equal split is the 
dominant mode of behavior what justifies the second claim. 
 
More generally, the strategic approach to bargaining and negotiation as propagated 
by Nash (1950 and 1953) and also Harsanyi and Selten (1972) may have misled 
experimental economists to  
 
  rigorously detail all subtleties via extensive form or stage games and 
  subjugate all information to common knowledge. 
 
Control questions and/or experience might guarantee that all strategic details are well 
understood. But stressing them might make participants wonder about them and 
cause demand effects, e.g. in the sense that double blind procedures (the 
experimenter only learns the distribution of all individual behavior, see Bolton and 
Zwick, 1995) raise suspicion rather than comfort participants that their individual 
behavior cannot be observed by the experimenter. 
 
Warning 3:  If one already concedes that (game) theoretic predictions usually  
fail, implementing the games as defined theoretically could turn 
out to be questionable due to overburdening participants, 
possible demand effects when providing specific details etc. 
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Note that the early experimental studies of bargaining and negotiation have used the 
so-called cooperative approach, e.g. by allowing free face-to-face negotiations based 
on characteristic function “games”  (see the respective Contributions to Experimental 
Economics, ed. Heinz Sauermann, 1978). Similarly, double auction experiments 
(Smith, 1962) rely on rules (who bids when?) which are largely unspecified. 
 
If one does not want to give up common (knowledge of) rationality one will, of course, 
try to align the (game) theoretic predictions with observed behavior (neoclassical 
repairs or game fitting, Güth, 1995). This inspired concepts of risk aversion
3 in 
stochastic tasks and of all sorts of other regarding concerns in studies of bargaining, 
negotiation and, more generally, distribution. In view of the rather recent tradition of 
experimental economics, we think the following is adequate: 
 
Warning 4:  In view of the little what so far can be concluded from  
experimental findings stating universal simplistic, e.g. aversion 
based theories of bargaining behavior, is premature. The only 
aversion concept to be encouraged is aversion aversion. 
 
The widely debated concept of inequity aversion (Loewenstein et al., 1989, Bolton, 
1991, and mainly Bolton and Ockenfels, 1998 and 2000, as well as Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999) has been inspired by ultimatum experiments and proved to account 
for several experimental findings.  But in recent generosity game experiments
4 (the 
proposer has a fixed agreement payoff x and can vary the pie size p and thus the 
offer p-x to the responder) for which inequity aversion predicts equality, the dominant 
mode of behavior is generosity (the largest p) rather than equality. This may illustrate 
how new experimental paradigms and probably new findings for old ones can 
question our interpretation of former results. If a third party is added and thus two 
agreement payoffs can be exogenously imposed the modal choice of p depends 
crucially on whether these two exogenous agreement payoffs are equal or not. 
 
                                            
3 In bargaining and negotiations the risks are often non-monetary ones, e.g., the risk of losing face, 
what renders the narrow concept of monetary risk taking by utility of money concepts rather 
questionable. 
4 Güth, Levati, and Ploner (2009) and Güth, Pull, Stadler, and Stribeck (2010). 
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Especially in view of the superior technologies in experimental data elicitation (mouse 
lab, eye tracking, videotaping, physiological and brain scan data), we should study 
process models of decision making and not substitute the question “why such 
behavior?” for one asking “why such preferences, beliefs, aversions?” Process 
models of boundedly rational decision making need not necessarily rule out game 
theoretic rationality but could allow for it under special conditions. Hopefully, this will 
provide the stage for including psychological research, teaching and learning how to 
bargain and offering negotiation advice. 
 
Warning 5:  Explaining all experimental findings by using the rational choice 
approach immunizes experimental economics against imports 
from psychological research and must therefore fail in our 
normative task of helping people to become better negotiators. 
  
3.  New methods and questions 
 
The major advantage
5 of computerized experiments, compared to pen-and-paper 
experiments, is to allow for extensive learning. It can be expected that this possibility 
to study learning in the lab will be further exploited. To avoid, however, the same 
frustration as psychologists – who very actively explored learning behavior much 
earlier, e.g. Bush and Mosteller, 1955 – one should be open to multifaceted learning 
rather than mechanically imposing the same type of adaptive dynamics (see 
Camerer, 2003, for a recent review). When participants, for instance get little 
information about their decision environment (stochastic and/or strategic), it is natural 
to first rely on the law of effect (reinforcement learning).  This, however, becomes 
more and more questionable when trying to mentally model the decision situation as 
feedback information accumulates. 
 
Conjecture 1:  Path dependence in negotiations will be studied more extensively 
but less so by constantly imposing the same single and simple-
minded adaptive dynamics and more so by exploring the 
                                            
5 A possible disadvantage could be that participants tend to decide too quickly without thoroughly 
deliberating what could be relevant when especially investigating the behavior of inexperienced 
participants. 
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changing type of dynamic adaptation in long processes of 
learning. 
 
A more direct application of new elicitation methods like eye tracking or brain 
scanning is, of course, that the future will allow us to check hypotheses in 
 
  action space (“does observed behavior confirm to predicted behavior?”)  
  payoff space (“are the predicted payoffs actually earned?”)   
  cognition space (“do the observed indicators of mental representations 
correspond to the theoretically postulated reasoning process?”) and by 
  brain activation data (“do more complex decisions require stronger 
brain activation in certain brain regions?”). 
 
With latter measurement techniques it will be easy to supplement the usual 
demographic questionnaire data with physiological characteristics of the probands, 
e.g. when trying to account for individual differences in behavior. Physiological 
reactions to stress may, for instance, be more suitable to assess individual attitudes 
towards risk than simple lottery choices (e.g. Andersson and Holm, 2002). 
 
Conjecture 2:  We will test hypotheses more reliably in action, payoff, cognition 
space and by brain activation data what will in all likelihood offer 
better methods to account for individual characteristics in 
negotiation behavior. 
 
Although in bargaining theory the coexistence of 
 
  intraparty conflicts (“do the delegates of a bargaining party really aim at what 
the clients, which they represent, want them to achieve?”) with 
  interparty conflicts (“which party gets more?”) 
 
is an old topic, experimentally this is largely under-researched
6. Mostly, one either 
studies bargaining by delegates or negotiations of delegates with their clients in 
isolation although the intraparty conflict may be crucial for how one interacts with the 
                                            
6 The same applies to intrafirm and interfirm conflicts of firms interacting on the same markets. 
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other parties at the negotiation table. The huge variety of negotiation processes can 
in many ways be influenced by how clients can codetermine the negotiation tactics 
and incentives of their delegates. 
 
Conjecture 3:  There will be attempts to capture both, intraparty and interparty  
bargaining, where one will begin by using familiar bargaining 
modules, e.g. take-or-leave-it contract offers of clients to their 
delegates and alternating offer bargaining of such incentivized 
delegates. 
 
Will the present request for more field experiments inspire more field research, 
related to bargaining and negotiations? There have been always strong traditions of 
field research regarding, for instance, international negotiations (Raiffa, 1997), labor 
negotiations and intrafamily bargaining where the dominant bargaining module is still 
the asymmetric Nash (1953) bargaining solution (e.g. Ott, 1992). However, field data 
will continue to be insufficient for distinguishing between bargaining theories differing 
in subtle details. When bargaining parties more often employ Internet conflict-
resolution platforms and when – after anonymizing the process data of such conflict 
resolution – the data become available, field research may become easier. But 
whether this will happen and, if so, which data will be provided can be at best 
speculated so far. 
 
In spite of all the data of bargaining experiments questioning the rational choice 
approach as a valid tool to explain empirical bargaining behavior, the main trend is 
still the one of including all sorts of motives, emotions and aversions. This renders a 
rational choice exercise more complex rather than simpler and – when Pandora‘s 
Box of neoclassical repairs can be freely used – even tautologic. The idea of 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) has existed nearly as long as experimental 
economics (e.g. Sauermann and Selten, 1959, Smith, 1962, Fouraker and Siegel, 
1963), but without much influence. This may be due to the fact that the idea of 
bounded rationality has been propagated without trying to formulate it rigorously. 
Especially when postulating that aspiration levels have to be revealed by choice 
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behavior
7, what one gets are at best well behaved aspiration data but hardly a test of 
the satisficing hypothesis. 
 
But why should we submit to the spell of the revealed aspiration approach? In 
experimental economics we often directly elicit action beliefs, e.g. when testing for 
let-down aversion (one does want to fulfill others’ expectations concerning the own 
behavior) and do not infer them from choice behavior. In our view, there is similarly 
no reason to refrain from directly eliciting aspiration levels
8. And for given reliable 
aspiration data, one can rigorously define and test whether or not a choice is 
satisficing. 
 
Conjecture 4:  With the help of directly elicited aspiration data we expect more  
bounded rationality attempts to explain and predict bargaining 
behavior and negotiation results.  
 
The latter conjecture better be true! In our view, teaching and learning bargaining 
behavior and better negotiation techniques requires reliance on mental models and 
concepts like success aspirations and satisficing in search. The concepts of the 
rational choice approach will not do when trying to advise negotiators how to bargain. 
What could be the concepts behind bounded rationality advice? The advice could be 
based on answers to the following questions (Güth, 2008): 
 
  Which scenarios (possible combinations of chance effects and/or others’ 
behavior) do you not dare to exclude? 
  Which success aspirations have you formed for each of your few scenarios? 
  Which action plans are you considering? Please, check successively in your 
preferred order whether one of the few seriously considered action plans 
satisfies your aspirations for all your scenarios. If so, you may stop. If not, you 
have to adapt either your scenarios and/or your success aspirations (scenario 
and aspiration adaptation, for the latter, see Sauermann and Selten, 1962) or 
develop other action plans. 
                                            
7 Note that when allowing for all sorts of motives and aversions the rational choice approach is also 
hardly specific when such motives and aversions have to be revealed in the tradition of the revealed 
preference approach. 
8 The problem is more how to incentivize stating aspirations (see Güth et al., 2008). 
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Scenario formation in this sense does not require but also does not exclude 
probabilistic reasoning and thereby intrapersonal aggregation of aspirations across 
scenarios like expected payoff maximization. It also does not rule out optimality but 
only renders it rather unlikely when confronting a complex negotiation task.  
 
Conjecture 5:  When studying bargaining behavior and negotiation styles the 
rational choice approach will be more and more supplanted by 
bounded rationality models of bargaining whose reliability can be 
tested experimentally when directly eliciting the results of 
scenario generation and aspiration formation and whose 
concepts are suitable for teaching, learning, and consulting. 
 
This predicted tendency should somewhat close the gap between the methods used 
and conclusions drawn by (cognitive and social) psychologists and experimental 
economists (e.g. Fellner et al., 2009, and Güth et al., 2009). 
 
4. New  research  questions 
 
When inviting participants to play a bargaining game in the lab, we can never be sure 
which social norms they import and more or less consciously apply. What may 
change is not the phenomenon as such but how we cope with it. One method could 
be to study so many task repetitions that the evolution of social norms in bargaining 
and negotiation behavior would emerge for study. Although participants may initially 
rely on imported norms, when receiving population feedback (participants learn about 
all past plays of a session and not only the own one) very likely norms will change by 




Hope 1:  The possibility to run many repetitions and to provide population  
feedback in computerized bargaining experiments should inspire 
attempts to study the social norm dynamics and their effects on 
bargaining behavior. 
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Rather than distinguishing bargaining only by individuals and groups
9 the astonishing 
heterogeneity of lab-observed bargaining behavior suggests a better control and 
categorization of individual and possibly group types. To elicit the appropriate 
characteristics, one may rely, for instance, on 
 
  panels for recruiting participants which may provide a lot of socio-demographic 
background information, 
  recruiting different types of participants varying in profession, age, gender and 
possibly different professional (negotiation) experiences, or 
  experiments with a “theory absorbing” pre-phase where participants 
experience first preprogrammed negotiators
10  or are exposed to theory by 
attending a lecture before they freely decide whether to follow the theory or 
their own ideas. 
 
  Hope 2:  Other and better methods of controlling individual characteristics of 
participants should lead to attempts to categorize types of participants 
who behave differently and vary in their bargaining success. This, in 
turn, can inspire studies on how negotiators try to find out others’ 
hidden negotiation styles. Or rather than trying to elicit individual 
characteristics one might prime participants by exposing them to 
“theory” in order to test the absorbability of, for instance, some 
“bargaining theory”. 
 
As quite generally true for all binding contracts, most negotiation agreements have to 
be incomplete. For instance, ambiguous property rights can prevent future efficiency 
enhancing investments by the negotiators (hold-up problem). So far very few 
experiments have studied negotiations where 
 
  some aspects of future behavior can be unambiguously agreed upon whereas 
                                            
9 We prefer the more general program of intraparty and interparty negotiations allowing for all forms of 
intragroup decision processes. 
10 Informing participants that these are programmed and according to which theory avoids any form of 
deception. 
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  other aspects necessarily have to remain open and be dealt with unilaterally or 
by a new round of negotiations. 
 
As an example imagine collective wage bargaining which details work conditions and 
what wage employees receive but does not anticipate which employees will be kept 
or laid off when a negative demand shock occurs. 
 
  Hope 3:  As in contract theory and the experimental studies related to it also 
bargaining experiments should focus on negotiations for incomplete 
contracts and how tough negotiations for contractable aspects will affect 
the mutual goodwill when having to negotiate the so far unsettled 
aspects. 
 
Although the double oral auction is poorly understood at the level of individual trader 
behavior (see the attempt of Sadrieh, 1990), it is one of the impressive success 
stories in experimental economics. The same may apply in the bargaining sphere: we 
know little about how to strategically model face-to-face negotiations with free 
communication in an environment where there are no specific rules except for those 
of declaring an agreement binding.
11 But as for the double oral auction the result of 
such poorly defined negotiation institutions may be reliably predictable. In our view, 
experimentalists should be open for such findings and may actually engage in 
systematically exploring such free negotiation procedures and thereby essentially 
revive the former tradition of characteristic function-bargaining experiments. 
 
  Hope 4:  Free negotiation procedures may be systematically explored and  
might prove to be rather efficiency enhancing. The endogenously 
evolving negotiation styles might also be more relevant for field 
research, e.g. by telling us which bargaining tactics are more 
successful. 
 
Lately rather crude designs, e.g. combinations of a public good game with an 
arbitrary subsequent punishment phase whose technology is in no way related to the 
                                            
11 For instance, by requiring that an agreement is binding if no party vetoes it during 5 minutes after 
announcing the agreed upon outcome to the experimenter. 
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public good environment
12, have received a lot of attention (Fehr et al., 2008). 
Hopefully, game models of future experiments will capture crucial aspects like 
bargaining and sanctioning more intuitively by rendering them as natural for some, 
however stylized, field situation. Punishment options are more often than not crucial 
aspects of the field situation (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1992) or of the strategic game, e.g. 
veto power in the ultimatum game or outside options and conflict in bargaining 
games, whose rules define how effectively one can punish. 
 
When maintaining rational-choice benchmarks, one might want to distinguish 
between sanctions as part of the equilibrium but not necessarily of the equilibrium 
play (see Bruttel et al., forthcoming ) and non-equilibrium sanctions like rejecting a 
positive offer in ultimatum bargaining. Equilibrium sanctions may not be used 
although they could stabilize mutually profitable equilibrium cooperation and non-
equilibrium sanctions may strongly enhance cooperation. It seems a good guess that 
what happens depends on how profitable cooperation and how effective the sanction 




5. Concluding  remarks 
 
One rather obvious prediction for the future of experimental economics is that its 
present boom will finally lead to its more intensive use in public finance (testing rules 
of public procurement tenders, tax compliance, evaluation of goods and services 
provided by public authorities, public administration, etc.), business administration, 
economic policy as well as in the neighboring sciences also exploring economic 
phenomena. We do not interpret this as a new direction but rather expect that the 
usual methods will be applied to new problems. This hopefully introduces and 
suggests some new and innovative experimental paradigms, e.g. bribery games 
when exploring the behavior of public administrators or inspector games when 
investigating monitoring in firms and other organizations. 
                                            
12 Due to strong reciprocity motives we always were aware of punishment as a way to behave 
reciprocally and that variations in punishment technology (see, for instance, Bolton and Zwick, 1995, 
Güth and Huck, 1997, Ahlert et al., 2001) will be crucial whether or not we follow our punishment 
inclinations. 
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 012  14
 
 On the other hand, the present boom of experimental economics might indicate a 
bubble which can collapse when overly optimistic expectations concerning how much 
can be learned within a short time are not fulfilled. Such outrageous expectations are 
partly self-induced, e.g. by predicting a behavioral revolution of economic policy or 
when claiming that (too) simplistic theories apply universally. But the main problem 
will be that progress in experimental economics like in other empirical research is 
slow whereas expectations for its progress and its insights are much more volatile. In 
our view, we should not be too optimistic. But even more realistic expectations may 
not prevent a crisis in experimental economics in the sense that its answers more 
often than not do not provide clear guidance. This could raise questions about the 
field’s acceptance in the community of all economists. Such a crisis would align 
hopes more closely with actual progress but it will not stop the gradual progress in 
the field of experimental economics.
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